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ABSTRACT: Cost-Benefit Analysis is a method to assess the effects of policies and projects on social welfare. 
CBAs are usually applied in a top-down approach, in the sense that a decision-making body first decides on 
which policies or projects are to be considered, and then applies a set of uniform criteria to identifying and 
valuing relevant cost and benefit flows. This paper investigates the possible advantages, prerequisites and 
limitations of applying CBA in what may be considered an alternative, “bottom-up”. Instead of starting out 
with a pre-defined policy option, the suggested approach begins with the underlying environmental problem, 
and then assesses costs and benefits of various strategies and solutions suggested by local and directly 
affected stakeholders. For empirical case studies concerning two river catchments in Sweden and Latvia, the 
bottom-up CBA approach utilises local knowledge, assesses plans which are not only developed for local 
conditions but are also likely to be more acceptable to local society, and sheds additional light on possible 
distributional effects. By not only benefitting from, but also supporting participative environmental planning, 
bottom-up CBA is in line with the growing trend of embedding stakeholder participation into environmental 
policy and decision-making.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
By accounting for market and non-market costs and benefits, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a method to assess 
the effects of policies and projects on social welfare. In CBA, all costs and benefits are monetarised and 
translated into a single number, the net present value (NPV). This index is usually interpreted in a 
straightforward manner: a positive NPV means that the social benefits outweigh the social costs of the 
assessed policy or project. Implementation of the policy or project is thus justified as it represents an efficient 
reallocation of resources that increases social welfare. Moreover, NPVs can be used to consistently rank a set 
of mutually-exclusive alternatives. Together with its theoretical foundation in welfare economics through the 
Kaldor-Hicks compensation test, these features make CBA a highly demanded and widely applied approach to 
policy and project evaluation world-wide (Hanley & Barbier, 2009). 
 
Usually, a CBA is applied as top-down approach, meaning a central decision-making body (such as a Finance 
ministry) issues guidance on which policies or projects are assessed, and how the costs and benefits to society 
are identified and then measured. CBA outcomes are used in the policy development process and as a driver 
of regulatory decision-making, although rarely as the single decision criterion (Atkinson et al., 2018). In this 
paper, we contribute to the literature by suggesting a bottom-up CBA approach as an alternative. A bottom-
up CBA, we argue, allows a more informed development of regulatory policies. Instead of starting with a policy 
or project option, this approach begins with an environmental problem, and then assesses costs and benefits 
of strategies identified by “local” stakeholders in pursuit of addressing this problem. While a top-down CBA 
can be used to assess the trade-offs of an already-defined set of projects or policies, the bottom-up approach 
takes advantage of additional case-specific knowledge, and assesses strategies which might be more likely to 
be accepted by the local society, and are better adapted to local conditions. Moreover, it facilitates the 
disclosure and possibly triggers discussions of distributional concerns to be considered in policy development, 
which is not a primary focus of top-down CBA (Hahn & Tetlock, 2008). By not only benefitting from, but also 
encouraging and supporting stakeholder engagement, bottom-up CBA is in line with the growing trend of 
embedding stakeholder participation into environmental policy and decision-making (e.g. Reed et al., 2009).  
 
Setting the system boundaries is a decisive step of every CBA and of crucial importance for the results and 
recommendations that may be obtained (e.g. Pearce et al., 2006). System boundaries establish the terms of 
reference, referring to both the scope of the object of assessment (the project), and the population whose 
well-being should be considered. Typically, the latter consists of a national population. In the bottom-up 
approach, the focus is on selecting those stakeholders whose strategies and preferences in terms of an 
environmental problem are to be analysed. In doing so, a balance of arguments is needed to enable practical 
feasibility for the bottom-up approach. First, it needs to be ensured that the boundaries are set in a way that 
a changing environmental condition primarily affects the welfare of the population within the spatial system, 
while possible impacts outside the system are secondary at the most and therefore, in this context, deemed 
negligible. Second, the boundaries need to allow the inclusion of all groups with areas of responsibility being 
directly connected to the environmental problem, which therefore embody the key agents who should be 
involved in addressing the problem. While consideration of different groups ensures the capturing of diverse 
interests and solution options, the inclusion of directly affected agents ensures that those who are most 
affected by a project get to participate in its appraisal and in implementing solutions, creating a sense of 
ownership to solutions which is likely to increase the chances of successful problem solving. The proposed 
bottom-up CBA approach is illustrated by two case studies, the Helge and Berze river catchments, located in 
Sweden and Latvia respectively.  
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After providing a background on CBA in Section 2, the potential role of bottom-up CBA in environmental 
planning, and the associated conditions to ensure its validity and practicability are outlined in Section 3. In 
Section 4 we empirically investigate the application of bottom-up CBA based on the two case studies, followed 
by the discussion of the results in Section 5. In Section 6, the circumstances under which bottom-up or top-
down CBA approaches should be preferred are discussed, whilst conclusions follow in Section 7.  
 
2 CBA AND THE POLICY PROCESS 
In the history of CBA, opinions are divided over whether the outcome of the CBA is the decision or just an 
input to decision making. There has also been discussion over whether it is the preferences of individuals 
(consumer sovereignty) or decision-making agents (political sovereignty) which should be relevant for the 
decision making (cf. Banzhaf, 2009). CBAs are usually conducted in what we refer to here as a top-down 
approach. This means that a central decision-making body decides on the set of policies or projects, which 
costs and benefits to society are to be assessed, and how to value these impacts. For instance Arrow et al. 
(1996) stress that “values […] assigned to program effects […] should be those of affected individuals” (p. 222), 
yet argue that, in order to compare the evaluated regulatory decisions across multiple areas of government 
(e.g. health, transport, energy), there is a need of overall consistency in terms of which impacts to include and 
what prices to use to value them, which implies a top-down approach. This means that, even when ensuring 
some participation due to consumer sovereignty, a conventional CBA does not usually allow for much 
influence over decision-making by those parties impacted by the project (Pearce et al., 2006).  
 
The influence of CBA in real-world decision-making is somewhat limited, yet is the method increasingly used 
as a tool to inform public policy decisions (Hahn & Tetlock, 2008; Hockley, 2014; Pearce et al., 2006). Hahn and 
Tetlock (2008) identify an important contribution of CBA in the process of policy development, for instance by 
preventing the adoption of “economically unsound regulations” (p.79) and eliminating “obviously bad 
proposals” (Hockley, 2014, p. 285). Apart from its role in the policy formulation stage, Atkinson et al. (2018) 
have identified cases with CBA as one tool within regulatory decision-making.  
 
Besides of its straightforward interpretation and the possibility of including impacts that might otherwise be 
ignored (Sunstein, 2000), ex-ante CBAs come not only with a high data demand, relying on predictions of future 
variables and estimations of monetary values of non-market goods, but also with the equally challenging 
problem of quantifying the physical effects of a project. Bertram et al. (2014), amongst others, argue that 
closing all existing data gaps needed for a comprehensive CBA is not achievable, and relying on current data 
does not solve the underlying uncertainties. Likewise, and due to practical and methodological challenges of 
environmental valuation, Klauer et al. (2016) consider a full-scale CBA to be warranted only in cases where 
considerable effort is justified. Finally, a “lack of participation can easily engender opposition to a project or 
policy, making it difficult to implement and costly to reverse”, while greater “[p]articipation may . . . produce 
better policy and project design” (Pearce et al., 2006, p. 285). However, top-down CBA does not do much to 
encourage such participation. An alternative way would consequently be the use of CBA as bottom-up 
approach. By extending the conception of consumer sovereignty, it is possible to take on board not only the 
preferences or choice of affected individuals regarding the valuation of impacts, but also regarding their 
preferences in terms of strategies of how these impacts can be best managed.  
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3 AN ALTERNATIVE: “BOTTOM-UP CBA” 
Instead of starting with a policy decision, a bottom-up approach analyses the “multitude of actors who interact 
at the operational (local) level on a particular problem or issue” and focuses on the “strategies pursued by 
various actors in pursuit of their objectives” (Sabatier, 1986, p. 22). Such problems or issues therefore serve 
as the starting point of a bottom-up approach, and thus determine the relevant actors. Being commonly 
accepted as one component in environmental planning  (Human & Davies, 2010), the benefits of including 
local stakeholders in policy planning processes go beyond its democratic value and the possibilities of 
describing societal values in an improved way (Beierle & Konisky, 2001). There is evidence that bottom-up 
approaches may result in advantages in terms of information and implementation, for instance due to 
harnessing local knowledge which in turn enhances innovation, effectiveness, or trustworthiness amongst 
stakeholders  (Beierle & Konisky, 2001; Graversgaard et al., 2017; Ostrom, 2010). Participative planning is also 
in line with political guidelines such as the Water Framework Directive or Principle 11 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1993; European Commission, 2003). 
 
Focusing on a specific environmental problem, a bottom-up CBA approach enables local stakeholders to 
discuss their knowledge, views, preferences and perceptions of the problem, and to subsequently suggest 
problem-solving strategies. The costs and benefits of the suggested strategies, as experienced and perceived 
by the stakeholders, are then be assessed and fed back into the participatory process. Stakeholders could then 
discuss this new input, i.e. the outcome of the CBA, and accordingly re-evaluate, validate and potentially adjust 
their suggestions for problem solving strategies. Such a bottom-up CBA approach would allow stakeholders to 
not only decide upon (i) the strategies to be assessed, but also (ii) which impacts should be considered as 
relevant for the welfare of the respective society. By contrast, in a top-down approach, both decisions (i) and 
(ii) are left to external experts (cf. Arrow et al., 1996).  
 
3.1 CONDITIONS FOR USING BOTTOM-UP CBA 
We argue that the validity and practicability of bottom-up CBA rests on meeting three main conditions, which 
are now outlined.  
 
Condition 1: No pre-defined choices  
In line with the underlying assumption that local stakeholders decide upon the actions to address an 
environmental problem which will be included in the CBA, the first condition is that such actions (that is, 
possible projects or policies) are not pre-defined by the analyst or regulator. This condition is crucial to achieve 
the main objectives of the bottom-up approach, which are (1) to generate strategies to address an 
environmental problem which represent the preferences of local stakeholders and are formulated within and 
adapted to the context of local conditions, as well as (2) to reveal the costs and benefits of these strategies as 
experienced and perceived by the affected actors.  
 
Condition 2: Identification of relevant stakeholders 
The results obtained from the bottom-up CBA are dependent upon the input of the selected stakeholders. 
Therefore, identifying who the stakeholders consist of in each case is key. Compared to top-down CBA, the 
subject of the analysis in the bottom-up approach is how affected stakeholders prefer to deal with an 
environmental problem, which therefore dictates the set of stakeholders (Reed et al., 2009). Consequently, 
the second condition is to include all stakeholders who are relevant to the environmental problem. Building 
on Freeman (1984) and Savage et al. (1991), this comprises individuals, groups or other organisations that can 
affect or are affected by either the environmental problem or its resolution. This includes economic actors 
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with agency, along with victims and beneficiaries impacted by (i) the environmental problem itself, (ii) the 
changing condition of the problem, or (iii) the suggested strategies producing such a change.   
 
Depending on the subject of the analysis, the number of stakeholders may be very high, and so for practical 
reasons only a sub-set can be included in the process. However, if the included stakeholders do not represent 
the interests of the society at large, i.e. every stakeholder matching the second condition, neither will the 
outcome of the CBA. To ensure the completeness of interests when limiting the number of participants, who 
comes forward as being representative of each stakeholder group should be carefully considered. Dealing with 
an environmental problem, this may include participants from farmers' unions, environmental NGOs, local 
agencies or other interest groups, reflecting diverse interests and stakes in the problem. Nevertheless, if the 
number of relevant participants is unfeasibly large, there might be a need to define additional criteria, such as 
geographical, demographic or impact-related boundaries (Reed et al., 2009). Such restrictions, however, come 
with limitations for the bottom-up CBA, which will be revisited in the third condition. 
 
To be able to react to emerging findings during the participative process, for instance if strategies developed 
as part of the bottom-up CBA process to address the environmental problem have an effect on or are affected 
by new stakeholders, the analysis requires a dynamic process where stakeholders can continuously be added 
or replaced. In general, the selection can be done by different means, such as stakeholder mapping (Bryson, 
2004), focus group interviews, snow-balling sampling or social network analyses (Reed et al., 2009). 
 
Condition 3: Representative scale   
In order to ensure that selected stakeholders fully represent all parties who are directly connected to the 
environmental problem but also that not “too many” parties participate to make the process workable, it may 
be necessary to restrict the geographic scale of a bottom-up CBA. This can be problematic for two reasons.  
First, many environmental problems are characterized by transboundary impacts and are therefore likely to 
affect social welfare beyond customarily-defined system boundaries which will often be administrative 
borders. For instance, emissions of a coal-fired power plant can have an impact on regional air pollution. CBA, 
however, considers only impacts occurring and being identified by the stakeholders within the defined 
boundaries which will often be delineated by municipality, regional or country borders. Impacts outside the 
defined system boundary will thus be neglected, even if they occur as a result of the (non-)implementation of 
strategies within the system boundaries, such as an improved filter on the power plant, or a law allowing to 
keep it in operation without any changes. Second, use or non-use values of goods or bads which are generated 
within the system boundaries, yet are held by actors outside the boundaries, may be neglected.  
 
The third condition consequently implies that bottom-up CBA may only be considered as sufficiently 
comprehensive if (i) the defined system boundaries allow the inclusion of all relevant stakeholder groups, as 
defined in the second condition, (ii) most of the costs and benefits are experienced or held by people within 
the defined system boundaries, and (iii) impacts outside the system are marginal. We refer to such a situation 
as achieving a useable representative scale. 
 
However, if conditions (1) – (3) cannot be met, it may still be both practical and useful to undertake a partial, 
bottom-up CBA. This may apply if the main intention is to use bottom-up CBA as a tool to support stakeholder 
participation, or if the fields of application are environmental matters with apparent and significant national 
or international non-use values which, however, come at a cost for local actors.  
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3.2 THE ROLE OF BOTTOM-UP CBA   
Following Hockley (2014, p. 289), who noted that “[d]emand for CBA will be highest if it helps decision makers 
deliver consequences demanded by citizens and/or if citizens directly incentivise its use”, CBA can be an ideal 
tool to foster participative environmental planning when the stakeholders themselves support the process 
and the outcome of the CBA. These symbiotic characteristics are more likely associated with bottom-up than 
with top-down CBA, and may result in practicable, targeted and accepted policy recommendations with clear 
implications regarding their possible impact on society’s welfare. By drawing on the mechanisms describing 
possible impacts on the output quality of participatory environmental planning, as summarised by 
Kochskämper et al. (2016), the role of bottom-up CBA in terms of the integration of local knowledge, 
stakeholder dialogue, and acceptance is outlined below. Furthermore, the role of CBA in integrating bottom-
up outcomes in policy making is addressed.  
 
Integration of local knowledge  
By assessing costs and benefits of strategies suggested by different stakeholder groups in pursuit of targeting 
self-identified pressures related to an environmental problem, the integration of local knowledge is the 
linchpin of a bottom-up approach. Stakeholders can provide more specific information, which might go beyond 
the knowledge of external or high-level experts (Kochskämper et al., 2016). Their experience with local settings 
is particularly beneficial due to the high degree of heterogeneity in local environmental conditions. It is 
therefore believed that local stakeholders can identify case-specific pressures more accurately, and have a 
deeper understanding of the practicability and performance of possible response strategies. Besides 
identifying possible solutions, stakeholder input can relate to determining relevant benefits and costs, as well 
as their values. Furthermore, they may be better informed about the range of possible direct and opportunity 
costs of the strategies, if they would affect their professional or interest areas (e.g. impacts on agricultural 
land quality).  
 
Stakeholder dialogue  
By definition, one would expect stakeholders to prioritise their own wellbeing over a broader society’s welfare. 
However, by developing a better understanding of each other's interests and preferences, stakeholders are 
more likely to develop new solutions that maximize mutual gains, often including environmental benefits 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Brody, 2003; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Kochskämper et al., 2016). Environmental 
concerns are nevertheless subjected to and frequently offset by competing interests, both within and outside 
a participative planning process (Albert et al., 2017; Kochskämper et al., 2016). An economic perspective can 
support the integration of the values of nature conservation into decision-making (Albert et al., 2017), for 
instance due to two crucial attributes of CBAs. First, multiple impacts which emerge from implementing certain 
strategies can be considered. Second, monetary valuation can be “a pragmatic tool to guide analysis and to 
allow informed comparisons” (Sunstein, 2000, p. 1094). As cost and benefit values are expressed in 
comparable and consistent terms both across stakeholders and over time, a bottom-up CBA enables 
stakeholders to consider impacts beyond those most apparent for one interest group yet not necessarily for 
another. In other words, by drawing on monetary terms detached from interests, the discussion may not only 
be about determining the most important impacts, but also about finding strategies with impacts generating 
the highest overall benefits.  
 
The participatory process is no guarantee that the different involved interest groups will necessarily agree on 
strategies, as evidenced by Kochskämper et al. (2016). However, “CBA is a way of encouraging people to think 
about, describe and then measure the multiple impacts of different policies and projects in a consistent 
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manner. In principle, this can be done in a very transparent way which encourages debates over the important 
parameters of a decision” (Hanley & Barbier, 2009, p. 308). While, from a CBA point of view, it is objectively 
evident if a strategy benefits society or not, these very discussions shed light on the preferences and reasons 
for aversion by single stakeholders or groups. Disagreement can for instance occur regarding the practicability 
of the actions, or the reasonability and valuation of the impact assumptions. Moreover, stakeholders might 
agree with the assumptions regarding an action, yet disagree with the implementation (from an executor point 
of view) or non-implementation (from a victim or beneficiary point of view). Such cases would occur if private 
costs exceed private benefits. Consequently, the CBA process facilitates disclosure and triggers discussions of 
the distributional effects of costs and benefits. Furthermore, by assuming that the stakeholder participation is 
embedded in a process with delegated power to influence decisions such as the participatory planning of the 
Water Framework Directive, one could imagine that presenting strategies with a demonstrably negative NPV 
(which might indicate disproportional costs of the action) would decrease the likelihood of their 
implementation. Bottom-up CBA as such would encourage stakeholders to reconsider and search for better 
solutions. 
 
Acceptance and implementation 
A participative planning process fosters dialogue amongst various interest groups and may therefore support 
outcomes with an increased acceptance by both stakeholders and policy makers (Kochskämper et al. (2016) 
and references therein). By ensuring early involvement and increasing transparency, both listed by Rowe and 
Frewer (2000) as evaluation criteria of participation processes, a bottom-up CBA can support the building of 
acceptance amongst stakeholders, for instance in terms of the costs and benefits identified as relevant by 
other stakeholders. By revealing and including “different, often opposite, views and interests regarding a 
problem” and converting them into coherent and comparable units, the CBA can contribute in “making 
problem definitions more adequate and broadly supported” (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003, p. 151). In addition to 
supporting the generation of acceptance, the CBA itself reflects the outcome of the participation, and thus 
pictures (to some extent) accepted strategies.  
 
4 EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES 
To empirically assess the process of bottom-up CBA, we applied this method in two case examples. Both cases, 
the Helge River in Sweden and the Berze River in Latvia, experience issues related to water quality, which 
constitutes the focal environmental problem of the bottom-up CBA. Both catchments require actions to 
improve the water quality. Table 1 provides a brief overview of the characteristics of the two case examples. 
 
Table 1 Case study areas 
 Berze River catchment (Latvia) Helge River catchment (Sweden) 
Country Latvia  Sweden 
Area   904 km2  4 725 km²  
Inhabitants 26,500 (50 % in urban areas) 131,000 (97 % in urban areas) 
Land use 50 % agriculture, 42 % forest 65 % forest, 15 % cropland, 7 % grazing land, 2 % urban area 
Identified water quality problems 
according to the Water Framework 
Directive 
Bad and poor ecological quality 
with respect to nutrients 
Eutrophication of surface water due to phosphorus and 
nitrogen. Some waters have problem with heavy metals 
(mercury) 
Source: BONUS MIRACLE (2015) 
 
The application of bottom-up CBA in both examples is desirable due to two reasons: First, as evidenced by the 
Water Framework Directive or the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, there is a demand for both CBA and 
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stakeholder involvement in cases like this1. Second, over-exploitation of water resources is a typical example 
for a market failure, which, for instance in the case of eutrophication, leads to insufficient incentives to reduce 
nutrient discharge. By internalising costs and benefits, the CBA can reveal this market failure and be used to 
assess possible remedies.  
 
The bottom-up CBA development process included several stakeholder workshops in both case areas, in 
which the assessed costs and benefits of suggested strategies, the strategies themselves, and the 
stakeholder composition were discussed, adjusted and validated ( 
Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1 Bottom-up CBA development process 
 
 
System Boundaries and selected stakeholders 
The geographical and hydrological river catchments were set as system boundaries for the bottom-up CBA, 
which is seen as ideal to facilitate the cooperation of all relevant actors (European Commission, 2016). Most 
of the impacts of potential actions occur within the respective catchments. Selected stakeholders were directly 
connected to either the water quality of the respective river catchment, or to management strategies 
developed throughout the CBA process (Table 2). It is notable that the Berze River case included a high share 
of public sector participants of centralised institutions, whereas the stakeholder groups in the Helge River case 
consisted mainly of decentralised institutions. 
 
Table 2 Represented stakeholder groups and agencies 
Stakeholder Group Agencies (Helge)  Agencies (Berze) 
Public Sector ▪ Water Association, Helge River 
▪ District Council, Kristianstad  
▪ Swedish Forest Agency  
▪ Initiative Model Forest in Helge å  
▪ Environment Committee, District of 
Hässleholm  
▪ Nature Management School in Osby  
▪ Municipal Office of Osby   
▪ Ministry of Environmental Protection and 
Regional Development 
▪ State Environmental Services  
▪ Ministry of Agriculture 
▪ Rural Support Service 
▪ Latvian Environment, Geology and 
Meteorology Centre 
▪ Health Inspectorate 
▪ Municipalities 
                                                          
1 For instance, the Water Framework Directive emphasises the role of both public participation and economic analyses 
to balance the various interests and increase enforceability (European Commission, 2016). It thereby suggests CBA as 
one way of identifying disproportionate costs (European Commission, 2009). The EU Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive requires member states to conduct CBAs before new measures are implemented (European Commission, 
2008). 
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▪ County Councils, Jelgava and Dobele 
Civil Society ▪ Swedish Society for Nature 
Conservation (SSNC), Kristianstad 
▪ Swedish Society for Nature 
Conservation (SSNC), Kronoberg  
▪ Latvian Fund for Nature 
▪ Baltic Environmental Forum 
Private Sector ▪ Farmers  
▪ Forest-Owner association 
▪ Regito Research Center on Water and 
Health 
▪ Farmers Parliament and Farmers 
▪ Hydropower plant Operators  
▪ Wastewater treatment plant operators   
▪ Property Management Group 
 
Management Strategies 
Following the bottom-up approach, the stakeholders first identified pressures which they perceive as causal 
factors of poor water quality within the system. Reaching a common ground on the pressures sets a frame for 
the strategies to reduce such pressures, as subsequently suggested by the stakeholders. Based on the inputs 
of the stakeholders, the relevant benefits of management actions in terms of ecosystem services which are 
compromised by the pressures were identified as illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Based on the identified 
pressures, the stakeholders suggested and then discussed measures which would, in their opinion, reduce 
these pressures and thus affect the environmental problem positively. Due to their preference to focus on the 
short- and medium-term over the longer-term implications, the stakeholders decided to set the time horizon 
for analysis as from now to 2030, which means that only costs and benefits occurring during this period will 
be considered in the subsequent CBA.  
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Figure 2 Assessment Framework, Helge River catchment 
 
Source: Own figure (inspired by Bertram et al., 2014; Grizzetti et al., 2016) 
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Figure 3 Assessment Framework, Berze River catchment 
 
Source: Own figure (inspired by Bertram et al., 2014; Grizzetti et al., 2016) 
 
It is necessary to establish a baseline (“business as usual” scenario) which reflects the current and future status 
of the environmental condition without additional societal response (Börger et al., 2017). Table 3 presents the 
baseline and possible future strategies suggested by the stakeholders. The baseline shows the measures 
related to water quality which are already or will be implemented to the end of the current EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) period in 2021. This includes measures of the first and second pillar of the CAP, the 
Water Framework Directive, and, in the case of the Helge River, measures by the County Administration and 
the municipalities. The alternative strategies represent potential additional measures, as suggested by the 
local stakeholders. To allow for comparisons, the baseline measures are assumed to continue until 2030, while 
the potential measures are assumed to be implemented in 2021 and last until 2030.  
 
In the Helge River case area, the developed set of strategies are not mutually exclusive as they focus on 
different areas of the river. The suggested measures are reported in Table 3. While the measures of the first 
strategy focus on the restoration of the aquatic ecosystems, the second strategy targets sustainable water 
management in forestry, which is the dominant land use practice and seen as a major source of nutrients and 
organic matters discharge.  
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Table 3 Stakeholder-suggested measures 
Measure Scope Unit  
Helge River Catchment 
Baseline measures 
Liming  
by doser  4262.4 tons/year  
by boat 673.6 tons/year  
by air 365.5 tons/year  
Buffer Strips 181  ha  
Wetlands  210  ha  
Individual Sewage Emission  
Reduction to normal level 5431  facilities  
Reduction from normal to high level 1657  facilities  
Non-productive field margins in agricultural landscape  300  ha  
Upgrade or removal of traditional water regulating dams   78  units  
Strategy 1 
Stormwater Ponds 15.35 Ha 
Flood plain 150 ha 
Wetlands 597.4 ha 
Phosphorus Wetlands 58.65 ha 
Riparian Zones 400 ha 
Re-Meandering   82.5 km 
Strategy 2  
Restoring Wet Forest 35,000 ha 
Transition from coniferous to broadleaved forest 500 ha 
Riparian Zones in Forest Landscape  600 ha 
Fishway or Removal of 
Migration Obstacle  
Size 1 3.1 m 
Size 2 184.48 m 
Size 3 31.3 units 
Culvert Replacement 4 units 
 
By contrast, the strategies developed for the Berze River catchment, reported in Table 4, focus on specific 
pressures. These relate to separate stakeholder groups and consist of fewer measures. The first strategy aims 
to decrease point source pollution due to discharges from wastewater treatment plants (WWTP), while the 
second strategy targets diffuse pollution by reducing nutrient run-off from agricultural land. Due to diverse 
stakeholder preferences, two alternative versions of the second strategy were developed;  
While all other measures are alike, the width of the ecological buffer strips along the main stem is 10 meters 
in Strategy 2a, and 5 meters in Strategy 2b. The objective of the third strategy is to decrease the pressure of 
water regulation due to hydropower plants.  
 
Table 4 Stakeholder-suggested measures 
Measure Scope Unit  
Berze River Catchment 
Baseline measures 
Crop Diversification  41,134     ha  
Ecological Focus Areas  2,930     ha  
Perennial Grassland  1,201     ha  
Organic Farming  1,305     ha  
Strategy 1 
Rural WWTPs [100 - 300 PE] 3     units  
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Strategy 2a 
Ecological Buffer Strips [2 + 10 m] 741     ha  
Sedimentation Ponds 4     ha  
Optimisation of fertilizer use – 20% reduction of mineral fertilizer application 32,320     ha  
Strategy 2b 
Ecological Buffer Strips [2 + 5 m] 540     ha  
Sedimentation Ponds 4     ha  
Optimisation of fertilizer use – 20% reduction of mineral fertilizer application 32,320     ha  
Strategy 3 
Fishways 5     units  
 
Identification of Physical Impacts of the Strategies 
While results for the mitigation of nutrients exist for the respective measures and catchments (Table 5 and 
Table 6), expert elicitation was used to assess the likely impacts in terms of the additional ecosystem services 
(Table 7 and Table 8). The experts chosen for assessing the qualitative impacts on ecosystem services are 
researchers from the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and Linköping University (LIU) for the Helge River 
catchment, and from the University of Latvia for the Berze River catchment. All of them were involved in 
projects covering the respective catchment. The assessment is therefore based on both scientific knowledge 
(e.g Maes et al. (2016) or the NWRM catalogue2) and experience with the respective catchment. Since this 
assessment may be considered a qualified guess that is inherently uncertain, we chose a qualitative ranking 
of the relative impact according to a negative, none, low, medium or high impact. Furthermore, the impact on 
the whole catchment is considered, i.e. the spatial scale of the measure is taken into account. The rating 
describes the experts' overall assessment of the likely impacts caused to the implementation of the strategies, 
compared to no implementation (Table 7 and Table 8).  
 
Table 5 Total nutrient mitigation at the river outlet, Helge catchment 
 Total N reduction (in kg/year) Total P reduction (in kg/year) 
Baseline  18,077 2,083 
Strategy 1  88,089 5,563 
Strategy 2 4,500 135 
Source: MIRACLE project results  
 
Table 6 Total nutrient mitigation at the river outlet, Berze catchment 
 Total N reduction (in kg/year) Total P reduction (in kg/year) 
Baseline 2,115 79 
Strategy 1 687 184 
Strategy 2a 86,474 2,654 
Strategy 2b 86,474 2,455 
Strategy 3 0 0 
Source: MIRACLE project results  
 
Table 7 Experts' rating of impacts in Helge river catchment 
 Ecosystem Service Baseline Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
Biodiversity/Habitat Preservation Medium Medium High 
Flood Risk Reduction Low Medium High 
Erosion/Sediment Control Medium Medium High 
Recreation and Tourism High High Medium 
Improved surface and groundwater quality  Medium Medium High 
                                                          
2 http://nwrm.eu/measures-catalogue 
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Table 8  Experts' rating of impacts in Berze river catchment 
 
Valuing Impacts  
Whenever original benefit information is missing for the respective case area, CBA methodology makes use of 
transferred benefits (value transfer). Czajkowski et al. (2017) argue that, in the context of water quality in the 
Baltic Sea region, an income adjusted value transfer performs the best. Consequently, the following formula 
was used to transfer benefits in the two case studies, to express environmental impacts of the prospective 
measures in monetary terms: 
 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦 (
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦
)
𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
[1.1] 
 
An income elasticity of value of unity was applied, which was identified as leading to the lowest transfer errors 
(Barton, 2002; Czajkowski et al., 2017; Czajkowski & Ščasný, 2010; Lindhjem & Navrud, 2015; Pearce, 2006). 
The income is based on the gross domestic product per inhabitant at 2016 market prices, as indicated by the 
European Commission (2017). Furthermore, as valuation studies often measure the willingness to pay for a 
positive (or negative) change versus the status quo, the experts’ rating scales, which consist of five levels, must 
be adapted if necessary. This is done as follows:  
 
Table 9 Conversion legend  
 
 
Relatively to other ecosystem services, a wide range of primary valuation studies related to aquatic ecosystems 
is available (Markandya, 2016), which allows for benefit transfer for most of the impacts. Databases, such as 
the Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI) or the TEEB Valuation Database provide a useful 
overview of various options in this regard, for instance in terms of what studies are available, and how to 
allocate unit values to the respective ecosystem services. To include the most suitable values, and to reduce 
the potential transfer errors which may occur due to transferring from too dissimilar sites (Kaul et al., 2013), 
the following priorities were set to identify and select valuation studies: similar site in (1) the same country, 
(2) in one of the other MIRACLE case study countries3, and (3) in a country within the Baltic Sea Region. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Germany, Poland, Latvia and Sweden 
 Ecosystem Service Baseline Strategy 1 Strategy 2a Strategy 2b Strategy 3 
Biodiversity/Habitat preservation Low Low High Medium High 
Flood Risk Reduction Low None/Negligible Medium Medium Low 
Erosion/Sediment Control Medium None/Negligible High High None/Negligible 
Recreation and Tourism None/Negligible Low Medium Medium High 
Improved surface and groundwater quality  Low Low Medium Medium None 
Valuation Study Rating 
Positive Change 
High Impact 
Medium Impact 
Status Quo  
Low Impact 
No Impact  
Negative Change Negative Impact 
15 
 
Table 10 Monetary benefit values (before and after transfer) 
 
 
 
 
Ecosystem Services Benefit Original Unit Value 
Transferred Unit 
Value (to Berze) 
Transferred Value 
(to Helge) 
Source 
Biodiversity/Habitat 
Preservation 
High number of different 
species of plants and 
animals, their population 
levels, number of 
different habitats and 
their size in the river 
ecosystem in the next 10 
years. 
4.6 Zloty 
[2007]/household/month 
 
8.7 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
246.0 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Birol et al. 
(2008) 
Habitat for endangered 
and protected species 
(Forest) 
8.0 EUR 
[2004]/person/year 
not used 
129.5 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Meyerhoff et 
al. (2009) 
Landscape diversity 
(Forest) 
4.6 [2004]/person/year not used 
14.2 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Species diversity (Forest) 12.5 [2004]/person/year not used 
190.3 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Provision of Food 
 
Recreation and 
Tourism 
 
Biodiversity 
Improve fish variety 
from “moderate” to 
“very high” 
42.2 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
15.8 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
543.8 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Ek and 
Persson 
(2016) 
Improve fish variety 
from “moderate” to 
“high” 
25.5 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
9.6 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
329.3 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Change fish variety from 
“moderate” to low” 
-287.6 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
-107.6 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
-3709.8 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Non-use Value - Salmons 
passing fish ladders 
(salmon increase 
between 1000 – 6000 
per year) 
51.0 SEK 
[2004]/person/year 
2.2 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
77.2 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Håkansson 
(2009) 
Access to the riverbank 
for recreational purpose 
6.6 Zloty 
[2007]/household/month 
12.5   EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
352.9 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Birol et al. 
(2008) 
Flood Risk Reduction 
Reduce flood risk from 
“high” to “low” 
14.5 Zloty 
[2007]/household/month 
 
27.4 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
775.4 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Surface water quality 
 
Erosion/Sediment 
Control 
 
Recreation & Tourism 
Erosion Prevention 
Grassland 
49.0 Dollar 
[2007]/ha/year  
15.72 EUR 
[2016]/ha/year 
541.87 SEK 
[2016]/ha/year de Groot et 
al. (2012)  Erosion Prevention 
Woodlands 
13.00 Dollar 
[2007]/ha/year  
not used 
143.8 SEK 
[2016]/ha/year 
Improve water clarity 
from "moderate" to 
"clear" 
106.4 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
35.1 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
1347.1 SEK 
[2016]/person/year Ek and 
Persson 
(2016) 
Change of water clarity 
from “moderate” to 
“turbid and colored” 
-199.8 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
-67.2 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
-2577.9 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Surface and 
groundwater quality 
(Ecological Status) 
Benefits of Nitrogen (N) 
and Phosphorous (P) 
reduction 
10.5 EUR (1995)/kg N 
reduction 
21.3 EUR (2016)/kg 
N reduction 
190.0 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Interwies et 
al. (2012) 
based on 
Turner et al. 
(1999) 
16 
 
Applying the Net Present Value Test  
To account for time preferences of individuals and following the national official recommendations, a social 
discount rate of 5 % is used for Berze River catchment (Ministry of Finance Latvia, 2016), and 3.5 % for Helge 
River catchment (Swedish Transport Administration, 2016). While the baseline strategies result in negative 
NPVs in both cases, all suggested strategies for improving water quality show higher benefit-cost ratios (BCR) 
and, except of Strategy 2a and 2b in the Berze River catchment, a positive NPV4.  
 
Table 11 and Table 12 give an idea about the distributional impacts of implementing possible measures relative 
to the baseline. Assuming that (a) no support mechanisms exist (as for instance the EU payments for some 
baseline measures), and (b) the respective land owning or controlling group must bear all costs related to a 
measure, it becomes evident that costs and benefits are not experienced by the same actors. For example, 
Strategy 3 for the Berze River catchment shows by far the highest BCR. However, while the hydropower sector 
is assumed to be responsible for all costs related to establishing fish ladders, the respective actors gain little, 
if at all, from the resulting benefits due to an improved biodiversity, recreation or tourism. Furthermore, the 
CBA results reveal the challenges in terms of potential conflicts amongst the different actor groups when it 
comes to agreeing on a single strategy. In the case of the Helge River catchment, the agricultural sector has to 
bear the largest share of the costs in Strategy 1, while this applies to the forestry sector if Strategy 2 would be 
implemented. Although some re-distribution/compensation mechanism might be implemented, the 
breakdown of the costs and benefits sheds light on the complexity of distributional effects which occur when 
implementing measures to improve environmental problems: Even if resulting in positive NPV, the strategies 
produce both losers and winners from a welfare economics point of view.   
 
However, the CBA results do not only transparently expose the cost and benefit implications of implementing 
strategies, but also the potential weaknesses of the environmental planning process. For instance, the 
stakeholders were not constrained by a financial budget. Strategy 2 for the Helge River catchment illustrates 
the resulting issue clearly. While the total benefits of Strategy 2 are the highest, its total costs exceed the costs 
of Strategy 1 by a factor of almost 6.  
 
Table 11 Costs and Benefits Summary5, Helge river catchment (Present Value (PV) in million SEK, 3.5 % social discount rate) 
Costs and Benefits Baseline (2017 – 2030) Strategy 1 (2021 – 2030) Strategy 2 (2021 – 2030) 
Total costs 854.773 328.055  1,868.961 
Total benefits 264.544 2,541.001  3,297.560  
 
Costs to    
   Agricultural Sector not applicable 256.281 0 
   Forestry Sector not applicable 0          1,754.578 
   Hydropower Sector not applicable 0             114.382  
   Others not applicable 71.774  0 
 
Benefit    
Biodiversity/Habitat 
Preservation                                  -                565.285              776.064 
Flood Risk Reduction                                  -                                    -                761.920 
Erosion/Sediment Control                                  -                                    -                     2.430 
                                                          
4 In a sensitivity analysis, we found that the signs of the NPV of all strategies do not change if the time period is 
extended to 2050 and 2100, or the social discount rate is changed to any value between 0 and 25 %, ceteris paribus.  
 
5 The full CBA spreadsheets are available from the authors upon request. 
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Recreation and Tourism                                  -                 346.805              422.637 
Water Purification  264.544              305.183                10.771 
Reduced Water Colouration                                  -            1,323.728          1,323.728 
 
NPV 519.229 2,212.946 1,428.590  
BCR 0.31 7.75 1.76 
 
Table 12 Cost and Benefits Summary, Berze river catchment (PV in million Euro, 5.0 % social discount rate) 
Costs and Benefits Baseline  
(2017 – 2030) 
Strategy 1  
(2021 – 2030) 
Strategy 2a  
(2021 – 2030) 
Strategy 2b  
(2021 – 2030) 
Strategy 3 
(2021 – 2030) 
Total costs 28.330 0.360 35.320  34.918  0.405 
Total benefits 11.218 0.688 32.247 29.890 6.915 
 
Costs to      
   Agricultural Sector not applicable 0 35.320 34.918 0 
   Hydropower Sector not applicable 0.360 0 0 0.405 
 
Benefit      
Biodiversity/Habitat 
Preservation 
- - 4.324  3.224 4.324 
Flood Risk Reduction - - 4.840 4.243 - 
Erosion/Sediment 
Control 
10.339 - 0.077 0.057 - 
Recreation and 
Tourism 
- - 2.203 2.203 2.592 
Water Purification  0.879 0.688                          20.802 20.163 - 
 
NPV -17.112 0.329 -3.074 -5.029 6.510 
BC ratio 0.40 1.91 0.91 0.86 17.06 
 
 
5 EXPERIENCES GAINED FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
 
Were the “Conditions for Use” met? 
Earlier in the paper we set out three conditions which we argued should be met if a full-scale application of 
bottom-up CBA was warranted. These conditions were (i) no pre-defined choices (ii) identification of relevant 
stakeholders and (iii) representative scale. As evidenced by the Water Framework Directive, which emphasises 
public participation and does not dictate pre-defined measures, the first condition is fulfilled: stakeholders in 
both case study areas could freely decide upon strategies to improve water quality in their respective river 
catchment without any further restrictions apart from the strategies achieving such improvement. On the 
contrary, the CBA results reveal that setting some guidelines, such as financial budget constraints, might be 
reasonable to improve the likelihood of integrating the outcomes in actual policy making.  
 
The second condition is more difficult to answer. Whilst the underlying environmental problem determined 
the selection of stakeholders in both case studies, and the included actors certainly match the definition of 
affecting or being affected by either the insufficient water quality or the change of it, completeness is 
uncertain. However, allowing that (1) stakeholders could continuously be added, (2) spatial and demographic 
differences were considered, and (3) actors from the public sector, civil society and private sector were 
represented, the likelihood of having overlooked important stakeholders is minimal. Yet, for instance the high 
share of public sector participants of centralised institutions in the Berze River case study may have caused 
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the suggestion of rather conventional measures, compared to the strategies in Helge River, where the 
stakeholder groups appeared to be more balanced and consisted mainly of decentralised institutions.  
 
Choosing an appropriate scale is the third condition for the bottom-up CBA. The Helge River represents a share 
of 0.39 %, and the Berze River 0.04 % of the rivers’ water inflow to the Baltic Sea. In terms of nutrient flows, 
the choice of setting the geographical and hydrological river catchments as system boundaries thus ensures 
that impacts outside the system boundaries may be considered marginal. However, due to the complexity of 
ecosystem services, it is difficult to estimate the relevance of additional physical impacts beyond the 
catchment level. An indication can be given by the values held by people for the consequences of water quality 
improvements. For instance, the wetland area “Kristianstad Vattenrike”, which is partly situated in the Helge 
catchment, is a preserved UNESCO Biosphere reserve with “landscapes and biological values of regional, 
national and international importance” (UNESCO, 2011) and various endangered or rare species (UNESCO, 
2006). This is indicative of significant values being held by society outside the river catchment. The total 
benefits from the implementation of water quality improvement measures are thus likely to be under-
represented in the outcome of the bottom-up CBA.  
 
Integration of local knowledge  
The integration of local knowledge can be observed in both case study areas, and at different stages of the 
CBA. Due to the explicit consideration of local stakeholder suggestions, the analysed strategies are generally 
perceived as practicable and shaped by local knowledge in terms of feasibility and costs. However, while the 
additional and specific knowledge input is likely to improve the output quality of the CBA, uncertainties 
regarding some costs and the actual impacts remain.   
 
Pressures: The integration of additional local knowledge into the process became evident during the 
identification of the relevant pressure. Due to the considerable role in national and EU legislation, nutrient 
pollution and flooding were initially expected to be the main pressures in both catchments. However, based 
on the perception of affected stakeholders, the regulation of the river flow was additionally identified as 
problematic in Berze River. Water colouration6 appeared to be the dominant issue in Helge River with the 
widest negative impact on various actors.  
 
Strategies: Measures in both case areas were added, removed or revised throughout the CBA process. In 
general, the strategies in Berze consist of rather conventional measures with a focus on the exact location and 
scope. By contrast, measures suggested in Helge additionally consist of innovative measures, which are in such 
form not yet implemented in the area, such as riparian zones or wetlands in forest landscapes. In the Berze 
River case, an example in which local knowledge turned out to be particularly valuable was in developing 
strategies to reduce point-source pollution. While the performance of the existing Waste Water Treatment 
Plants (WWTPs) was seen as insufficient so that upgrading of WWTPs and the connection to remaining 
households was initially suggested, it was identified as irrelevant after further stakeholder investigations which 
detected that further upgrades would not be technically feasible. Consequently, outdated and 
underperforming WWTPs were identified and suggested to be renewed, as evidenced by strategy 1.  
 
Costs: stakeholders appeared to have a good understanding of possible costs of the strategies, either based 
on own or their networks' knowledge. In the Helge River case, where existing cost information of innovative 
                                                          
6 also referred to as “brownification“ (e.g. Tuvendal & Elmqvist, 2011) 
19 
 
measures was largely unavailable due to a lacking experience, stakeholders could for instance indicate the 
opportunity costs in terms of respective land prices or gross margins in areas where the implementation would 
be feasible. While this allows for making qualified approximations, investment or administration costs in such 
cases often remain uncertain.  
 
Impacts: The local stakeholders had a clear understanding of what impacts they wanted to achieve, yet 
sometimes different opinions on how to achieve them.    
 
Stakeholder dialogue 
By converting complex data sets and connections into easily interpretable outcomes, the CBA supported 
dialogue in both case studies, mainly due to highlighting the importance of considering multiple benefits and 
revealing how assumptions and uncertainties influence outcomes and conclusions. By developing a dynamic, 
spreadsheet-based CBA template which could be altered during stakeholder meetings, stakeholders could 
discuss possible outcomes of the strategies by means of changing the working assumptions, such as benefits, 
time horizons, physical impacts, or costs and scopes of measures. Using CBA to foster discussions did not 
necessarily lead to reaching agreement amongst the stakeholders in terms of best practices; different 
sentiments remain. In Helge, actions to restore a natural river flow were intended to promote biodiversity, yet 
an opposing group acknowledged that changing the flow might be counterproductive, as biodiversity-rich 
grassland areas could be flooded. As evidence regarding the precise biodiversity effects was not available, the 
CBA was unable to produce decisive recommendations, but it still supported dialogue by presenting and 
contrasting existing valuations of grassland and river biodiversity, as well as values of additional benefits 
emerging due to river restoration or keeping grasslands (e.g. de Groot et al., 2012). The CBA was in practice 
not able to shed light on every disagreement nor provide evidence for the optimal solution, but discussions 
and concerns of stakeholders around these uncertainties illuminated key issues which policy makers should 
consider when considering or promoting certain measures.  
 
Acceptance and implementation 
Although bottom-up CBA may increase the acceptance of implementing certain measures, stakeholders 
resisted some of the measures discussed on grounds of cost. The willingness to implement costly strategies 
goes hand in hand with two factors, namely compensation and the demand for evidence. Compensation 
usually needs to fully cover the expenses of the implementation and maintenance of any implemented 
measure, including administrative costs and lost incomes. Otherwise the uptake of measures is unlikely. This 
is exemplified by buffer strips in the Berze River catchment, which are, although seen as appropriate and 
beneficial, are not implemented on a broad scale due to insufficient payments. Interestingly, some 
stakeholders took the view that the required compensation must not necessarily be of monetary nature, but 
could be achieved by different means: The forestry sector in Helge indicated the willingness to allow forest 
areas to be flooded, if, in exchange, fish ladders (by-passes) are installed at hydropower plants. 
 
Compensation is however not the only requirement to reach a willingness to implement measures. The Helge 
River case revealed the demand for more evidence. The forestry sector is seen by most stakeholder groups as 
a main source of organic matter discharge to the river, yet evidence on what really causes water colouration 
is missing. While stakeholders of the forest sector expressed willingness to implement measures, as pictured 
in strategy 2, they also required scientific proof that these measures would really result in positive impacts.  
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In conclusion, even when a bottom-up CBA raises acceptance by showing that social benefits of a certain 
strategy would outweigh the costs, non-coercive implementation remains unlikely if private costs exceed 
private benefits unless compensated from the social surplus. Hence, redistribution mechanisms need to be 
considered. In addition, research suggests that the implementation of voluntary agri-environmental measures 
might be compromised due to concerns farmers concerns over social disapproval for being paid for “doing 
nothing” – as might be seen to be the case with land retirement to reduce nutrient pollution (Burton et al., 
2008). Working with bottom-up CBA might lead to a change of perceptions of stakeholders by highlighting the 
positive impacts of such measures. This could lead to an increased willingness to implement voluntary 
environmental measures.  
 
6 PERSPECTIVES ON THE APPROACHES: BOTTOM-UP, TOP-DOWN OR BOTH?  
The case studies suggest that bottom-up CBA supports participatory processes, and generates additional local 
knowledge beyond existing information, which may serve as input to facilitate better and more well-informed 
decision-making. The remaining question is when the bottom-up CBA approach should be applied, and under 
which circumstances the top-down CBA, or a combination of both methods can be beneficial.  
 
From the welfare economics perspective, the interpretation of bottom-up CBA outcomes is in fact equal to 
that of top-down approaches, since it simply re-applies the Kaldor-Hicks test to a differently-defined group of 
winners and losers. Furthermore, when it comes to monetary valuation, the use of social discount rates or the 
calculation of NPV, the outcome of bottom-up CBA is likely to entail similar uncertainties to a top-down CBA. 
What differs is who suggests the strategies to be assessed, and who decides what should be considered as 
relevant for the welfare of the respective society. Contrary to the conventional top-down approach, bottom-
up CBA leaves these decisions to local and directly affected stakeholders.  
 
The choice which approach should be applied thus depends on the aim of what should be appraised. If the 
intention is to assess how social welfare is affected by an already-defined set of projects or policies, a top-
down CBA must be used. Alternatively, if the intention is to generate strategies to address an environmental 
problem, whereas such strategies should represent the preferences of stakeholders, and are both formulated 
within and adapted to the context of local conditions, as well as to reveal the costs and benefits of these 
strategies as experienced and perceived by the affected actors, the bottom-up approach should be used. In 
this way, the outcome is, at least to some extent, more likely to be accepted by local people, which is not 
necessarily the case for environmental policies developed by top-down experts (Carr, 2002; Smith, 2008).  
 
However, due to assessing different settings and thus generating different findings, top-down and bottom-up 
CBA are not mutually exclusive. By providing local insights, bottom-up CBA can deliver complementary 
information for decision-makers, supporting and increasing the quality of top-down CBAs, which may be 
required when it comes to projects or policies affecting a larger scale. For instance, Hanley and Black (2006) 
found that benefits of implementing the Water Framework Directive in Scotland generally outweigh the costs, 
but also indicate hotspots: Impact, cost and benefit estimates were shaped by a high degree of uncertainty, 
possibly induced by varying ecological and socioeconomic factors in large-scale analysis. By providing local 
information, the bottom-up approach can validate the assumptions of top-down CBA and thus reduce possible 
conflicts.  
 
If the input variables and outcomes across both approaches do not match, the CBAs will transparently point 
out where the assumptions differ, which may increase the understanding of discrepancies amongst external 
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decision-makers and local stakeholders. In such cases, two possible scenarios emerge for decision-makers who 
draw on findings of both approaches: On the one hand, the stakeholders’ perceptions may turn out as 
reasonable and should therefore be, in one way or another, accounted for. This can either be achieved by 
adapting the projects or policies, which are assessed in the top-down approach, to better match local 
preferences, or by using the newly generated information to develop compensation, support or tax schemes. 
On the other hand, stakeholders’ perceptions may be distorted, for instance due to neglecting budget 
constraints or variables which affect wider societal welfare. This information can inform decision-makers as to 
where to raise awareness or counter possible misinformation, such as relevant costs or benefits the 
stakeholders are not considering or aware of. This in turn may increase the societal acceptance of new policies 
or projects.  
If all input variables in both CBA approaches are similar, and yet the outcome is not, applying both approaches 
gives further indications on distributional effects. The sub-set of society represented by the bottom-up CBA, 
may lose (or win) due to implementing a certain strategy, while the wider society, represented by the top-
down CBA, may gain (or lose).   
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A bottom-up CBA is a beneficial approach to generate and assess strategies which represent the preferences 
of local stakeholders and address a given environmental problem. A bottom-up CBA represents a useful 
complement to a conventional top-down CBA, as it assesses different settings and thus generates different 
insights. Since it draws on many of the same economic principles as top-down CBA (such as monetary valuation 
and social discounting), the bottom-up CBA delivers insights which can be incorporated within a broader CBA 
analysis. The advantages of bottom-up CBA go beyond the assessment of perceived costs and benefits of 
strategies addressing an environmental problem. As the evaluated strategies are formulated within and 
adapted to the context of local conditions, and as both the strategies and the impacts represent the 
preferences and the perception of the local society, policy-makers gain valuable information of what measures 
may be feasible and which impacts are perceived as important. This additional knowledge can be used to 
adjust top-down policies, improve support or tax mechanisms, or to raise societal awareness in terms of 
important yet neglected impacts, costs or benefits. Moreover, bottom-up CBA can support participative 
environmental planning by fostering stakeholder dialogue and increasing acceptance, for instance by 
increasing transparency in decision-making, and contributing to making their outcomes more valid from a 
political perspective. 
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